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Introduction 
The present-day milieu is fixated on distinguishing the younger generations, the 
“Millennials” and “iGeneration”, from the older “Generation X” and “Baby Boomers”. 
American news and media outlets accuse the younger generations of being entitled, screen-
captivated, and even “narcissistic praise-hounds” (Safer, 2007, p. 2).  These call-outs are so 
ubiquitous that most of us have heard similar remarks in our own lives, possibly in the form of 
quips such as “kids these days” and “okay, boomer”.  But do such accusations actually apply to 
today’s youth?  Could it be that every generation eventually adopts disdain for the youngest 
cohorts?  Or are all younger generations morally deficient and “cocky about their place in the 
world” (Stein, 2013, p. 3)?  This paper will explore if and how younger generations are diverging 
from their elders in several facets.  
Such accusations are not all speculation.  Over recent decades, there have been numerous 
shifts in generational cohort characteristics.  Research conducted by Twenge (2013) found 
increases in narcissism among Millennials, as well as shifts from holding intrinsic values (such 
as community) towards extrinsic values (such as status and wealth) in high esteem.  Time 
Magazine broadcasted Millennials as being the “Me Me Me Generation” with a cover story issue 
in 2013 detailing their expectations of promotions, raises, and relying on their own inner voice as 
their leading moral compass.  A study by PEW Research Center (2006) found the highest goals 
of Millennials (those who were 18-25 years old at the time) were to become rich or famous (as 
cited Jayson, 2007).   
The study conducted for this capstone shows generational differences in some key and 
potentially important areas.  As we approach the end of the 2010s, iGen and Millennials will 
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begin to increasingly rise and replace the retiring Baby Boomer generation in the workforce.  
Schneider (1987) argues that organizational climates mirror the values and goals of those in 
leadership (as cited by Twenge, Campbell, Hoffman, & Lance, 2010).  As iGen and Millennials 
are becoming more significant players in society, albeit as graduates, employees, voters, or 
parents, examining their coinciding moral foundations, worldviews, and intellectual humility will 
help illuminate what shifts in values, perspectives, and discourse we can expect to accompany 
them.  
This is especially important in today’s fraught political atmosphere.  Politics is one of the 
most salient platforms of our moral psychology (Haidt, 2012), and often acts as a “virtue debate 
stage”.  Against a political backdrop, we see where our morals and values overlap and diverge 
across groups.  This paper explores the relevance of political polarization, generation cohort, 
morality, worldviews, and intellectual humility through the lens of positive psychology.  As the 
discipline concerned with meaning (Seligman, 2013), it is essential to the advancement of the 
field to investigate changes in a culture’s central values.  I will first give an overview of the 
literature on generation cohorts.  Then, I will introduce the field of positive psychology and how 
it can provide a contextual lens for some of the current trends that researchers are finding among 
younger generations.  Then, I will review the literature on morality, worldviews, and intellectual 
humility as relevant value constructs examined within this study.  Subsequently, I will provide 
the study and analysis conducted for this capstone, highlighting where Millennials and iGen 
stand today. 
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Part I: Generation Characteristics 
Distinguishing Generation Cohorts 
Establishing what date range qualifies as a ‘new generation’ is not always clear (Twenge, 
n.d.). Generational distinctions are often determined by cultural, economic, or historical events 
that cause significant pivots in societal values that affect the up-bringing of those in critical 
developmental years (Twenge et al., 2010).  For example, the Baby Boomers who were born 
during or after World War II spent their developmental years in post-war progress and 
prosperity, and adopted an optimistic and hardworking disposition (Gursoy, Maier, & Chi, 
2008).  Generation X are often referred to as “latchkey” children because they were commonly 
left unsupervised while both parents were at work (Seemiller & Grace, 2016).  In examining the 
validity of “generation” as a construct, Campbell, Twenge, and Campbell (2017) found 
significant differences between birth year cohorts, as evidenced among factors such as parenting 
style, social norms, attitudes, behaviors, personality, and mental health (Twenge et al., 2010). 
This paper adopts their generational categories of the Silent Generation, Baby Boomers, Gen X, 
Millennials, and iGen.  
Silent Generation.  The Silent Generation, born between 1925 and 1945, makes up some 
of the oldest living people today (Twenge et al., 2010).  Raised by parents who endured the Great 
Depression, this presumably influenced and garnered mature attitudes and resourcefulness, 
leading to a more cautious and unpretentious nature (Howe, 2014).  
Baby Boomers.  Baby Boomers are those born between 1946 and 1964 (Twenge, 
Honeycutt, Prislin, & Sherman, 2016).  They received their namesake as the soldiers returning 
home from World War II quickly started families, creating a baby-boom (Seemiller & Grace, 
2016).  These postwar individuals grew up in a growing economy where success was measured 
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by acquiring the “American dream”.  Having a good job, owning a family car and a home decked 
with modern amenities were the rewards earned by working hard.  Baby Boomers also saw 
important social movements, such as the civil rights movement and anti-war demonstrations 
protesting the Vietnam War (Seemiller & Grace, 2016).   
Gen X.  Generation X (Gen X) includes those who were born between 1965 and 1979 
(Twenge et al., 2016).  Gen X grew up in a time where technology was advancing.  As 
adolescents, Gen X saw personal computers and gaming systems reach the family household 
(Seemiller & Grace, 2016).  During this era, married women were entering the workforce in 
unprecedented numbers, making it normal for Gen Xers to be periodically left home alone after 
school, encouraging independence at a young age. Seemiller and Grace (2016) suggest that 
nationally renowned events such as the economic recession of 2008 may have contributed to a 
generational disposition of skepticism and pragmatism. 
Millennials.  The year that best marks the end of Gen X and start of the next generation 
is particularly unclear. Here, Millennials, otherwise referred to as Generation Y, are considered 
as those born between 1980 and 1994 (Twenge et al., 2016).  According to Lukianoff and Haidt 
(2015), many parents of Millennials were alarmed by the surge of child abductions making news 
in the 1980’s, making it appear that the world was not safe.  Parents passed that sense of danger 
on to their Millennial children, coddling them throughout their up-bringing.  Millennials are 
commonly thought of as being self-righteous, self-involved, and overly confident (Seemiller & 
Grace, 2016).  They grew up with high expectations of career success and a leisurely lifestyle; 
contributing to being typecast as impatient and entitled.  As early adopters of social media, their 
constant social connection has blurred the boundaries between work and play.  As Millennials 
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entered their legal voting years in the early 2000s, political polarization increased (Haidt & 
Lukianoff, 2015).  
iGen.  The iGeneration (iGen) includes those born between 1995 and 2010 (sometimes 
referred to as Generation Z; Twenge et al., 2016).  They received their moniker as the generation 
who grew up with the iPhone, which was released in 2007 (Seemiller & Grace, 2016).  A year 
prior, in 2006, Facebook allowed 13 year olds to join the social media platform (Lukianoff & 
Haidt, 2015).  While most Millennials can remember when technology entered the palm of their 
hands, iGen never knew differently. Seemiller and Grace (2016) suspect that this serves as an 
advantage to iGen, equipping them with the technological skills to solve global issues that they 
have always had access to.  Their research found that iGen self-reported as being compassionate, 
open-minded, thoughtful, determined, loyal, and responsible.  In response to their “Generation 
Me” predecessors, they see themselves as “Generation We”. 
Literature on Shifts 
I have thus far highlighted today’s generational categories.  Understanding the birth year 
cut offs that have been adopted for this paper, along with some significant events that may have 
influenced the various generations, provides a stronger contextual basis for understanding 
differences in morals, worldviews, and intellectual humility and polarization.  I will now provide 
literature on the shifts that have been witnessed on college campuses, in the workplace, and 
within politics.  These three sectors are important aspects of modern humanity, and provide 
tangible examples of how generational differences may be expressed in some of our most 
commonly shared domains.  
On campus.  Millennials and iGen have gone to college, and academics are noticing.  
Lukianoff and Haidt (2015) raise alarm to the new attitudes of students on college campuses.  
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They recognize the adoption of what they call vindictive protectiveness, a proactive kind of 
vengeance intended to protect against and punish that which is perceived as offensive.  Lukianoff 
and Haidt (2015) note how this brings moral outrage to the classroom, contributing to a setting 
propagated by moral allegiance, fear and fragility.  A prime example marking this new era can be 
seen in 2016’s “New York University Forum: Right to Say: Freedom, Respect, and Campus 
Speech” in which several NYU professors and a student debated trigger warnings on campus 
(“Topical Punch”, 2016).  The differences among generational attitudes are palpable in this 
debate, marking a clear divide in moral approaches to how (academic) authorities should 
demonstrate care, fairness and loyalty (all of which are key factors of Haidt’s moral foundations, 
discussed later in this paper).  Lukianoff and Haidt (2015) point to the combined rise in mental 
illness, emotional protectiveness, political polarization, and use of social media as contributing 
factors to vindictive protectiveness. While social media has connected younger generations to 
more national and global issues, it may be precipitating the coupling of disagreement with 
escalation.  With the advent Facebook’s “like” button in 2009, online participation shifted 
toward creating content that generated the most likes, or eventually on Twitter, the most re-
tweets.  An easy way to illicit a large response is to activate strong emotions such as outrage and 
anger.  This may point to not only the changing tide of values among younger generations, but 
how the social media norms of discourse crept into the classroom. 
At work.  Twenge et al. (2010) examined generational differences in career and work 
values in which participants were asked the same questions at the same stage and age in life.  
With a sample (N= 16,507) of high school seniors in 1976 (Baby Boomers), 1991 (Gen X), and 
2006 (Millennials), Millennials were found to have lower altruistic work values, such as helping 
others and supporting society, than older generations.  Additionally, they showed a decline in 
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favoring social values at work (such as making friends), and intrinsic values (such as having an 
interesting, results-oriented job) in comparison to Baby Boomers.  What showed to be central to 
the younger generation was an increase in leisure values and “perks”.  In recent years, 
organizations have hence added amenities, such as in-office gyms, flex-time, and catered 
lunches, to project a sense of relaxation and fun in the workplace. These findings not only 
highlight ways in which employers are attracting younger employees by aligning with their 
values, they show what values the younger generations will bring into organizations.  
In politics.  Current research signals a rising dichotomous political and ideological 
schema being hedged by generational cohorts.  Polarization can be considered the tendency to 
view opposing partisans (the “out-group”) in a negative light, and co-partisans (the “in-group”) 
in a positive light (Iyengar & Westwood, 2014). Hill (2005) defines political polarization as a 
growing separation between distinct groups.  Twenge et al. (2016) found that more Americans in 
the 2010’s were expressing more polarized political views, stronger affiliations with parties, and 
stronger ideological self-categorization (such as liberal versus conservative).  The results of three 
national surveys (N=10 million) showed more individuals identifying extremely with their 
political party (mostly driven by Republicans), and fewer people holding moderate ideological 
stances, even when controlling for age effects.  Iyengar and Westwood (2014) have also 
examined a dramatic increase in polarization across American party lines.   
Newport (2014) and other researchers found that Millennials are more likely to identify 
as Democrats and liberals than Baby Boomers and Gen Xers (as cited in Twenge et al., 2016).1 
 
1 There is a possibility that this may be due to the current age range of Millennials and iGen, as 
younger individuals historically trend towards identifying as Democrat (Twenge, 
Honeycutt, Prislin, & Sherman, 2016). Understanding the political and ideological self-
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Because Americans become more politically polarized with age, there is a strong possibility that 
Millennials and iGen will continue to identify themselves as extreme with adulthood, rather than 
sway toward the moderately positioned middle. Further research points to younger generations 
maintaining the political positions they ascribe to today, as Ghitza and Gelman (2014) claim that 
the political events that occur over a person’s life span, especially in their young adult years, 
inform how one votes ongoing throughout their life (as cited in Twenge et al., 2016).  The most 
recent presidential election has coincided with polarization and outrage on both sides of the 
political spectrum, and will likely effect the young adults of today for the rest of their voting 
lives.   
Political polarization and expressions of outrage are characterized by out-group hostility; 
and Haidt and Hetherington (2012) have found that negative views of “out-groups” have risen 
since the 1980s.  Iyengar and Westwood (2014) suggest that the discrimination expressed across 
party lines is more-so out of animosity towards the opposing group than it is for in-group loyalty 
and preference. According to Van Boven, Judd, and Sherman (2012), those who identify extremely 
with their party or ideology have stronger perceptions of polarization than those who don’t.  This 
is not a result of viewing their own positions as drastic, but because they feel that the opposing 
“out-group” to be prejudiced and self-interested. Tajfel and Turner (1979) have shown that in-
group members often assign negative traits to members of their opposing out-groups (as cited in 
Iyengar & Westwood, 2014). Mark Lilla wrote in the New York Times article, “The End of 
Identity Liberalism”, that liberals interpret Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential win in a way that 
 
categorization differences between generations is best comprehended with long-term data 
collection and when age is controlled for. 
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posits liberals (the “in-group” in this case) as being superior to the corruptible, even racist, lower-
middle class conservatives.  This interpretation signifies confirmation bias, or the predisposition 
to notice, remember, and value evidence that supports our initial beliefs and to not notice 
countering evidence (Reivich & Saltzberg, 2018). The assumption of mal-intent and hatred 
towards those in the out-group, along with confirmation bias, naturally leads to the conflicts we 
see in our political discourse.  Political campaigns are often fueled with out-group hostility, 
slandering, and attack ads.  American politics falling significantly on a bi-partisan spectrum 
ranging from Democrat to Republican enhances the sense of polarization and may only encourage 
opposition.  
While political party identification provides a framework for orienting and understanding 
the political schema or atmosphere, Tajfel and Turner (2010) claim that it also shapes our social 
atmosphere more significantly than other social agents (as cited in Twenge et al., 2016).  A 
significant finding of Iyengar and Westwood (2014) concluded that the out-group partisan divide 
is as strongly influential with political identity as it is race.  Race has remained a divisive factor 
in America for centuries.  Activists have endlessly fought against racial discrimination, spawning 
movements such as The Civil Rights movement of the mid twentieth century, and the modern 
movement, Black Lives Matter. Political identity partisanship reaching as divisive effects as race 
is alarming.  Compared to race, partisanship is something that is voluntary.  Although race is 
often a more immediately identifiable trait in comparison to political association, affiliations can 
be embedded and signaled in who we socialize with, our place of work, attire, on our lawns, and 
on our social media (Iyengar & Westwood, 2014).  The pervasion of social identity into our 
everyday self-representation is also on the rise.  Neighborhoods (Bishop, 2008) and marriages 
(Rosenfeld, Reuben, & Falcon, 2011) are becoming more politically homogeneous (as cited in 
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Iyengar & Westwood, 2014), further contributing to the distancing and separation of in-groups 
from their out-groups.   
Takeaways.  We see indicators of culture-shifts as younger generations venture into 
college, the workplace, and politics.  Politics in particular is the domain that houses a nation’s 
virtues (Haidt & Joseph, 2004); and acts as a conduit of society’s values.  As more Americans 
flock to extreme and opposite ends of the political spectrum, there becomes less room for nuance 
and multiplicity.  Haidt and Joseph (2004) argue that moral diversity is born out of political 
diversity.  Political homogeneity may be a siren warning us of an endangered diversity of 
politics, moral values and worldviews.  Furthermore, discrimination towards “out-groups” is 
becoming more pronounced, and the current socio-political environment does not have 
strongholds to prevent such marginalizing discourse.  Productive discussion in a morally diverse 
society requires the acknowledgment that all proponents are morally motivated (Haidt & Joseph, 
2004). By looking through the lens of positive psychology, we may better understand our human 
inclinations and moral motivations behind group membership, and where there is room to 
improve amidst this polarized political climate.  I will continue by introducing positive 
psychology and its connection to moral psychology; followed by a review of moral foundations, 
primals, and intellectual humility and how they are relevant areas of study.  
II: Positive Psychology 
With an emphasis on scientific research and statistical data, positive psychology 
examines positive emotions, institutions, virtues and more to uncover what brings about well-
being in human-beings (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000).  Throughout history, there have 
been various approaches to well-being, or “the good life”, but one of the most salient may be 
Aristotle’s concept of eudaimonia. Aristotle examined that the road toward happiness is often 
GENERATIONAL SHIFTS    
 
 
11
paved with struggle and hardship, and thus, our pursuits must be towards “higher virtues” rather 
than mere pleasure or amusement (Melchert, 2002).  Eudaimonia is concerned with what makes 
a life well-lived.  A major pillar of positive psychology pulls from this morally charged concept, 
asserting that focusing on strengths of character, as opposed to deficits, can support human 
flourishing (Peterson & Seligman, 2004).  Examining the historical underpinnings here will 
further build upon well-being’s connection to virtuous character, morality, world views and how 
groups adopt these at scale.  
 The agricultural revolution marked a profound change in humanity, as it ignited an 
abundance of resources and time.  As farming gave way to a surplus of food, people were able to 
settle, establish societies, and generate culture (McMahon, 2017). Not having to hunt and gather 
led to more free-time, which opened individuals up to philosophizing about the natures of 
society, existence, happiness, and virtue.  The excess generated by the agricultural revolution, 
however, also gave way to inheritable inequalities.  Families would pass down their commodities 
to kin, generation to generation, setting the stage for hierarchies, slavery and oppression 
(McMahon, 2017).  This system kept happiness outside of one’s control, and subject to the life 
you happened to be born into. Happiness was fleeting, or at best, considered a matter of luck. 
This is contrasted with today’s view, in which happiness is seen as something people can 
achieve. From the time where happiness seemed to rest on fate or chance, humanity looked to 
religion for answers. 
The advancement and increasing complexities of society demanded more intricate 
explications of human conduct and existence.  It is not a surprise that the world’s greatest 
religions emerged out of The Axial Age, including Buddhism, Judaism, Greek philosophy, and 
more (McMahon, 2017). Religion was not only a quest for understanding happiness, it was a 
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search for meaning, a code of right and wrong, and provided the safety and communal benefits of 
belonging to a group.  Being a member of a group, tribe, or religion increased one’s likelihood 
and means of survival, and hence, we saw our first emerging forms of in-group and out-group 
loyalty.  
We have a deep, inner yearning to be part of a tribe.  We have evolved to be groupish just 
as much as we are driven by our own individual pursuits (Haidt, 2012).  While we may seek 
different types of relationships at different times in our lives (Smith, 2017), what remains is a 
need for some type of social structure to direct our sense of belonging and meaning.  Haidt, 
Seder, and Kesebir (2008) claim that we often derive fulfillment from the collective identity that 
forms out of community belonging.  Likewise, Baumeister and Leary (1995) maintain that the 
human condition cannot be understood without comprehending close relationships (as cited in 
Gable & Gosnell, 2011).  Interestingly, the study of relationships was, at first, omitted from the 
consideration of positive psychology. Martin Seligman, the leading authority in positive 
psychology, initially neglected relationships in his first book, Authentic Happiness.  It wasn’t 
until over a decade later that he included relationships to be an important domain of the PERMA 
model2 for well-being (Seligman, 2013). Positive psychology has since opened the floodgates 
beyond individualism to explore well-being within dyads and groups. On this account, political 
groups can serve as a valuable construct for understanding well-being; and polarization may be 
thought of as a hyper-activation of this psychological human trait to be part of and loyal to a 
group tribe.  
 
2 The PERMA model consists of five elements of well-being.  These include positive emotions, 
engagement, relationships, meaning, and achievement (Seligman, 2013). 
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Part III: Literature on Morality, Worldviews, & Intellectual Humility 
I have thus far reviewed the literature on generational shifts in educational, vocational, 
and political settings.  We can understand the rise in political polarization, especially among 
younger generations, through the lens of positive psychology and its concern for living well and 
virtuously.  Now, I will cover the literature on morality, worldview, and intellectual humility as 
relevant value constructs examined in this study.  
Moral Foundations 
Haidt claims that morality was one of the strongest components influencing the human 
species reaching the top of the animal kingdom (personal communication, December 8th, 2017).  
Before the development and proliferation of language, humans could detect shared intentions 
among one another.  This enabled our ancestors to communicate shared values, which led to 
cooperation and tribalism. Such cooperation is just as important in interpersonal relationships 
today, as we all exist in what Haidt (2012) describes as the moral matrix.  Explained as the 
constructed moral system adopted by a given society, the moral matrix demands a negotiated 
way of interrelating with one another.  Graham and colleagues (2013) have identified five 
ubiquitous, adaptive foundations of morality.  The moral foundations theory posits care/harm, 
fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, sanctity/degradation as the directing 
components of the human moral compass (Graham et al., 2013).   A sixth foundation, 
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liberty/oppression, is currently being researched, and was not included in this study3. Further 
detail of the former five moral foundations and their properties are as follows. 
Care/Harm.  Caring for kin has been an adaptive necessity for all mammals (Graham et 
al., 2013).  Offspring do not survive without being looked after and attended to, and thus, it is 
part of our evolutionary nature to care for others.  This foundation has matured to a value 
spectrum of nurturing and suffering.  If you measure high on the care/harm scale, having 
compassion for others, including victims, and anger for perpetrators is very relevant to your 
moral reasoning.  
Fairness/Cheating.  Social interaction demands cooperation.  As a social species, 
cooperation is leveraged by the fairness in both the relational and transactional aspects of our 
interactions. This foundation encompasses virtues of trustworthiness and justice and the vices of 
cheating that are at play in our collaborations (Graham et al., 2013).  Those who highly endorse 
fairness, aspire towards proportionality (Haidt, 2012).  
Loyalty/Betrayal.  Coalitions were advantageous to winning wars and finding food. 
Thus, loyalty to one’s tribe emerged as a virtuous characteristic.  Today, loyalty to the in-group 
may be expressed in politics, sports, consumer brands, etc. This moral foundation is concerned 
with group pride, rage, threat, and patriotism (Graham et al., 2013).  
Authority/Subversion.  Hierarchies often lend themselves to order and efficiency, and 
one’s obedience or deference to such order has had social and survival impacts.  Today, 
 
3 The liberty/oppression foundation is concerned with the restriction of one’s freedoms. Those 
who endorse this foundation are triggered by oppression and tyranny, often leading to 
reactance (Haidt, 2012).   
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hierarchies can be exhibited in a variety of ways, such as in relationships between teachers and 
students, bosses and employees, and so forth.  It weighs aspects of respect, fear, and rank in 
moral considerations, as well as honoring traditions (Graham et al., 2013). 
Sanctity/Degradation.  This moral foundation is often referred to as the “purity” 
foundation.  According to Graham et al., (2013), the emotion of disgust has adaptive advantages 
to survival.  Cultures develop taboos as a way to discourage certain behaviors that are not 
advantageous, such as incest and food cleanliness.  When we attach morality to our behaviors, it 
makes it much easier to negotiate whether or not to do certain things.  We sanctify the things that 
are thought to be good for us, and we degrade those that are not.  Modern considerations of 
purity can be seen in our views on sex and diet. 
Moral Foundations and Politics.  While each of us possess all of these moral 
foundations, they vary to certain degrees among individuals and across groups.  Conservatives 
tend to value these foundations fairly evenly, whereas liberals rank authority, loyalty, and 
sanctity quite low comparatively (Haidt, 2012).  Haidt and Joseph (2004) claim that liberals have 
an increased capacity to spot victimization, and also rely on virtues related to reciprocity, such as 
fairness, and equality.  Whereas conservatives see hierarchies as relating to order, karma, and the 
capitalist notion of reaping what you sow, liberals view hierarchies as oppressive.  The study 
reported below looks at how moral foundations are distributed among political and generational 
factors. 
Worldview 
According to Reivich and Shatte (2002), beliefs often give rise to our feelings and 
behaviors.  In fact, a major therapeutic method emerged out of this very premise.  Ellis and Ellis 
(2011) describe cognitive behavioral therapy as the approach that addresses one’s belief systems 
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in how they drive emotions, reactions, and their corresponding or resulting behaviors (as cited in 
Clifton, 2013).  In Clifton’s (2013) initial exploration of primals (which were previously referred 
to as “universal assessments”), he identified that world belief systems generated momentum 
when philosophers such as Kant and Hegel introduced the concept of Weltanschauung, or 
“world-view”.  Kant’s approach to Weltanschauung posits the individual as having a centralized 
moral and cognitive perspective from which they extrapolate meaning or non-meaning in life 
(Clifton, 2013).  This concept gained widespread attention in Europe, reaching psychologists 
such as Piaget and Bartlett, who eventually brought schemas under the consideration of 
psychology.  Nash (2013) considers schemas to be the framework through which a person 
organizes and interprets information (as cited in Clifton, 2013).  As such, schemas garner 
expectations around how we understand the world and our past, present, and future experiences.  
Clifton and colleagues (in press) continued the exploration of universal assessments by 
examining over 80,000 Tweets, 358 historical texts, the 840 most used adjectives, the 24 
strengths (as distinguished by the VIA character institute), 10 positive emotions, and conducted 
10 religious focus groups and a literature review of six various disciplines to determine 
categories for general “beliefs about the world”, otherwise known as primals.  By identifying 
patterns of descriptions about the world, these researchers could determine not only how people 
talked about the modus operandi of the internal world, but their beliefs regarding how everything 
in life typically functions. The researchers created a “Primals Archive” containing the qualities 
that people attribute to their world descriptions. The final instructions developed for the Primals 
Inventory (PI-99) includes 99 items measuring 26 primals.  Examples of primals include 
(believing the world is…) abundant, changing, funny, intentional, pleasurable, and so forth.   
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Oakerson asserts that primals potentially hold significant indications and influence over 
political beliefs (as cited in Clifton et al., in press, p. 70).  If world beliefs bear notable impact on 
one’s political identity, they will thusly impact one’s political activity as well.  It is easy to 
surmise how believing the world to be primarily hierarchical versus beautiful may influence how 
a person participates civically.  For this reason, I examined seven primals in the survey 
conducted for this capstone that Clifton et al. (in press) found to be generally predictive and/or 
related to political ideologies.  These select primals include: Hierarchical, Just, Progressing, 
Cooperative, Beautiful, and Harmless.  
Intellectual Humility 
An important aspect of positive psychology is the science of character, which aims to 
identify what is best about humanity, recognizing traits as being both stable and malleable in 
individuals.  Peterson and Seligman (2004) created a classification of virtues in which twenty-
four character strengths are categorized.  Character strengths must meet the criteria of being 
fulfilling, morally valued, ubiquitous, and not diminish others (Seligman, Steen, & Peterson, 
2005).  They must also be distinct and have obvious and negative antonyms. The six virtue 
categories that house the strengths are wisdom, courage, humanity, justice, temperance, and 
transcendence. Some examples of the character strengths under these virtue categories include 
curiosity, zest, kindness, fairness, humility, and humor respectively. The VIA Strengths test is a 
comprehensive and multidimensional questionnaire that identifies a person’s top ranking 
strengths.  This provides each individual a unique profile, stressing that strengths are expressed 
in combination with one another (Niemiec, 2017).  Signature strengths are the top strengths that 
are the most easy, effortless, energizing and essential to an individual. 
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The virtue category of temperance encompasses strengths that relate to one’s ability to 
balance, moderate, and safeguard against life’s extremes, excesses, and indulgences (VIA 
Character, n.d.). Humility falls under this category, and is considered to be the disposition of 
modesty.  Tangney (2000) qualifies intrapersonal aspects of humility, such as having accurate 
views of one’s self, accomplishments, and limitations.  Other researchers, such as Davis, 
Worthington and Hook (2010) identify interpersonal qualities of humility such as the ability to 
be self-less (as cited in Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, 2016).   
Krumrei-Mancuso and Rouse (2016) put forth the construct of intellectual humility (IH) 
as a potential agent for promoting thriving through a culture of tolerance, collaboration, and civil 
discourse.  What distinguishes IH is having accurate and modest views of knowledge, ideas, 
beliefs, and opinions (Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, 2016).  IH involves holding a humble stance, 
acknowledging the limits and biases that influence one’s ideas.  Niemiec (2017) stresses that 
character strengths can be developed, and that character involves a behavior or action in accord 
with virtue. While the overuse of humility is found to be positively associated with social anxiety 
(Freidlin, Littman-Ovadia, & Niemiec, 2017), the underuse may have equally consequential 
social impacts.  Krumrei-Mancuso and Rouse (2016) assert that IH aims for an Aristotelian mean 
between these potential self-effacing and grandiose qualities.  In this way, IH may be a nuanced 
strength to cultivate in light of political polarization and with the shifts in values of the upcoming 
generations.   
Krumrei-Mancuso and Rouse (2016) conducted various studies to create the 22-item 
Comprehensive Intellectual Humility Scale that measures four aspects of intellectual humility 
which they find to be distinct but inter-correlated.  The first category is independence of intellect 
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and ego4; the second: openness to revising one’s viewpoint; the third: respect for other’s 
viewpoints; the fourth: having a lack of intellectual overconfidence.  These four components 
mirror Tangey’s (2000) conception of humility as involving openness, self-forgetfulness, modest 
self-assessment, and a concentration on others (as cited in Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, 2016).  
Examining the levels of intellectual humility among today’s generation cohorts will serve as an 
important tool for positive political discourse and initiate a baseline for future studies going 
forward. 
Part IV: Study 
This study examined the spread of generation and political polarization factors on 
morality, worldviews, and intellectual humility.  The scales used to measure these factors 
included those discussed above: Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) including the five 
subscales of care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, 
sanctity/degradation; six Primals scales including Hierarchical, Just, Progressing, Cooperative, 
Beautiful, and Harmless; and the Comprehensive Intellectual Humility Scale (CIHS), including 
the four subscales of independence of intellect and ego, openness to revising one’s viewpoint, 
respect for other’s viewpoints, and having a lack of intellectual overconfidence. 
Method 
A 93-item questionnaire was created on Survey Monkey and administered through the 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk) online platform on June 18th, 2018. Three items on the 
 
4 Having a high independence of intellect and ego means to have a healthy identity not entirely 
dependent on one’s own intellect.  Having a low independence of intellect and ego indicates 
being intellectually-egotistic, in which someone may feel personally attacked when their 
ideas are challenged.   
GENERATIONAL SHIFTS    
 
 
20
questionnaire were “attention checks” or validation questions.  Participants who answered 
incorrectly on two or more of these questions were omitted from the data results.  Participants 
who did not complete every question on the survey were also omitted.  537 responses were 
initially collected, 37 were omitted, resulting in a sample size of N=500.  311 (62.2%) of the 
participants were male; 188 (37.6%) of the participants were female, and 1 participant identified 
as “Other”.   Generationally speaking, 8.2% of respondents were iGen (n=41); 72.2% of 
respondents were Millennials (n=361); 13.8% of respondents were Gen X (n=69); 5.4% of 
respondents were Baby Boomers (n=27);  .4% of respondents belonged to the Silent Generation 
(n=2); The spread of political party affiliation amongst participants was as follows: 42.2% 
Democrat (n=211); 28% Republican (n = 140); 5% Libertarian (n = 25); 2.2% Green (n =11); 
18.2% Independent (n= 91); .2% Other (n =1); 4.2% None (n =21).  The spread of political 
ideology held amongst participants was as follows: 8% Very conservative (n =40); 17% 
Conservative (n =85); 9.6% Slightly conservative (n =48); 17.4% Moderate (n =87); 9.6% 
Slightly liberal (n =48); 21.2% Liberal (n =106); 15.4% Very liberal (n = 77); 1.8% N/A (n =9).  
Measures.  Participants were prompted with the thirty items on the MFQ.  The prompt 
for the MFQ was as follows: “Our first set of questions give you some general prompts.  When 
you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the following considerations 
relevant to your thinking?”  Response options were placed on the following six-point Likert 
scale: 1= “Not at all relevant”, 2= Not very relevant”, 3= “Slightly relevant”, 4= “Somewhat 
relevant”, 5= “Very relevant”, 6= Extremely relevant”.  For the second set of MFQ items, 
participants were given the following prompt: “These questions are slightly different.  Please 
read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or disagreement”.  Response options 
were posited on a six-point Likert scale and included: “1= “Strongly disagree”, 2= “Moderately 
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disagree”, 3= “Slightly disagree”, 4= “Slightly agree”, 5= “Moderately agree”, 6= “Strongly 
agree”.  One “attention check” question was administered in each of the two MFQ sections.  The 
lowest possible score on the MFQ is 0, meaning you completely reject the foundation.  The 
highest possible score is 5, meaning you strongly uphold that foundation as a bedrock of your 
morality. 
The following primals were selected due to their henceforth correlation to political beliefs 
and ideologies and well-rounded representation of main primal factors, such as (“the world 
being…”) safe, enticing, alive, and good. These primals are listed here with corresponding item 
examples.  Hierarchical: “Most things in the world can be ranked in order of importance.” Just: 
“On the whole, the world is a place where we get what we deserve.”  Progressing: “It feels like 
the world is getting better and better.” Cooperative: “The world runs on trust and cooperation 
way more than suspicion and competition.” Beautiful: “In life, there’s way more beauty than 
ugliness.” Harmless: “On the whole, the world is a safe place.” 
The Comprehensive Intellectual Humility Scale (CIHS) includes 22-items and 4 sub-
scales, which are listed here with corresponding item examples.  Having a lack of intellectual 
overconfidence: “My ideas are usually better than other people’s ideas.” (This item was reverse 
coded.)   Respect for other’s viewpoints: “I welcome different ways of thinking about important 
topics.”  Openness to revising one’s viewpoint: “I am willing to change my position on an 
important issue in the face of good reasons.”  Independence of intellect and ego: “I tend to feel 
threatened when others disagree with me on topics that are close to my heart.” 
Following these three questionnaires, participants were asked general demographic 
questions including birth year, gender, ethnicity, education, household income, personal income, 
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political party preference, strength of political party affiliation, political ideology, and who they 
voted for in the 2016 presidential election.   
Party polarization was determined by one question following a question concerning 
political party that asked “How strongly do you affiliate with that party?” Response choices were 
1= “Strongly”, 2= “Moderately”, 3= “Slightly”, 4 = “I do not associate with a party even 
slightly”.  Those who identified “strongly” with their party were categorized as being polarized.   
Ideological polarization was determined by the following item: “When it comes to 
politics do you usually think of yourself as”, with the following response options: 1= “Very 
conservative”, 2= “Conservative”, 3= “Slightly conservative”, 4= “Moderate”, 5= “Slightly 
liberal”, 6= “Liberal”, 7= “Very liberal”, 8= “None of the above/ don’t know”.  Those who 
answered as “Very Conservative” or “Very Liberal” were considered ideologically polarized. 
Analysis 
Independent samples t-tests were run to compare the younger generations to the older 
generations and younger polarized individuals to non-polarized individuals.  For each 
independent samples T-test, the test variables included the 5 subscales of the MFQ (care/harm, 
fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, sanctity/degradation), the 6 Primals 
scales (Hierarchical, Just, Progressing, Cooperative, Beautiful, and Harmless), and the 4 sub-
scales of the CIHS (independence of intellect and ego; openness to revising one’s viewpoint; 
respect for other’s viewpoints; having a lack of intellectual overconfidence).  Significance (2-
tailed) was initially determined by p <.05.  It was subsequently adjusted with Bonferroni’s 
correction, making p <.003.  Cronbach’s alpha was calculated for each scale.  For each 
relationship, Cohen’s d, or the effect size, was also calculated. 
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An independent samples t-test compared younger generations (those born in or after 
1980; iGen and Millennials) to older generations (those born in or after 1980; Gen X, Baby 
Boomers, Silent Generation).  See Table 1.  Another independent samples t-test compared 
younger generations who were polarized by political party (n=143) to the rest of the sample. See 
Table 2.  Another independent samples t-test compared the younger generations who had 
polarized ideological affiliations (n=91) versus the rest of the sample.  See Table 3.  
Results 
The results of the first independent samples t-test compared younger generations (iGen 
and Millennials) to older generations (Gen X, Baby Boomers, Silent Generation).  The younger 
generations more-so adopt a hierarchical worldview (p =.001; d =.36).  Older generations more 
highly endorse moralities of care (p =.001; d =.41) and fairness (p =.003; d =.3), see the world as 
more cooperative (p =.0005; d =.38), and more-so lack overconfidence in intellect (p =.001; d 
=.45) and are less intellectually-egotistic (p =.0001; d =.65).  See Table 1. When comparing 
younger, politically polarized individuals to the rest of the sample through an independent 
samples t-test, the former population showed to more highly endorse the loyalty (p =.003; d 
=.28) and purity (p =.003; d =.3) moral foundations, and were more intellectually-egotistic (p 
=.000; d =.4). See Table 2.   
A descriptive and frequencies analysis revealed that 34.8% of the total sample identified 
strongly with their political party, and 82% of those individuals were iGen or Millennials.  The 
generational makeup of those who identified strongly with their political party are as follows: 
iGen: n = 13; Millennials: n = 130; Gen X: n = 23; Baby Boomers: n = 8.  28.6% of the total 
sample population was made up of younger individuals who identified as being polarized by 
their political party affiliation.  
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The general dispersion of political ideological polarization across the total sample 
comprised 8% self-identifying as “Very conservative”, and 15.4% identifying as “Very liberal”.  
In sum, 23.4% of the sample was polarized ideologically (identifying as “Very conservative” or 
“Very liberal”).  18.2% of the total sample consisted of younger individuals identifying as 
ideologically polarized, who showed to more highly endorse the fairness moral foundation (p 
=.001; d =.37).  They also scored lower on the just (p =.003; d =.38) and progressing (p =.004; 
d=.32) primals, and thus on average, do not hold the view that the world is a just or progressing 
place as much as other individuals.  See Table 3. 
 
 
 
Discussion 
This study has examined how younger generations may be shifting the moral and 
political landscape, with special consideration of the rise in political polarization.  The most 
pronounced differences were found in comparing generations on the CIHS scales.  Younger 
individuals in this study possessed less intellectual humility, being more highly intellectually-
egotistic and overconfident. In other words, they are more overly confident in regards to their 
intellect; and their intellect is more-so connected to their ego, or sense of self.  Younger 
Table 3
Young Generations Politically Polarized by Ideology
Moral Foundations Primals Comprehensive Intellectual Humility Scale
Care Loyalty Authority Fairness Purity Heirarchical Just Progressing Cooperative Beautiful Harmless
Lack of 
Overconfidence
Openness to 
Revision
Respect for 
others 
Viewpoints
 Independence 
of Intellect and 
Ego
Mean 4.71 3.51 3.55 4.74 3.41 3.54 3.44 3.15 3.19 3.93 3.40 17.25 19.77 22.11 15.36
N 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92
Std. Deviation 0.96 1.39 1.32 0.90 1.46 1.12 1.12 1.08 1.07 1.00 1.06 4.85 3.94 4.30 5.95
Mean 4.42 3.76 3.92 4.42 3.62 3.74 3.82 3.48 3.28 4.00 3.54 17.39 19.12 21.54 15.76
N 408 408 408 408 408 408 408 408 408 408 408 408 408 408 408
Std. Deviation 0.88 0.97 0.93 0.84 1.18 0.85 0.86 0.96 0.89 0.82 0.84 3.98 3.36 3.46 4.91
Sig (2-tailed) 0.006 0.102 0.015 0.001* 0.214 0.115 0.003* 0.004 0.390 0.533 0.235 0.771 0.102 0.174 0.546
d 0.31 0.21 0.32 0.37 0.16 0.20 0.38 0.32 0.19 0.07 0.15 0.03 0.18 0.15 0.07
α 0.74 0.83 0.78 0.72 0.86 0.69 0.71 0.69 0.62 0.57 0.70 0.67 0.82 0.66 0.91
Notes. The generational categories (iGen and millennials) have been collapsed into"younger generations".  
*p < .003 after Bonferroni's correction p < .05/15 = .003
Younger 
Generations 
Polarized 
Ideologically
Remainder of 
Sample
Between 
Groups
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individuals who are polarized by political party also scored lower in intellectual humility in these 
same areas.  (However, younger individuals did score higher on showing respect for others 
viewpoints.)  Scoring low in these categories indicate more defensive and combative reactions to 
intellectual discord.   
Younger generations scored higher on the hierarchical and progressing primal scales.  
The hierarchy primal is concerned with seeing the world in terms rank-order, and “involves an 
assumption about the extent to which difference implies something is better or worse…or 
meaningless” (Clifton et al., in press, p. 99).  Younger generations seeing the world in terms of 
hierarchy may relate to their marked stance on seeing hierarchies as oppressive (Haidt & Joseph, 
2004), and increased levels of tolerance for minorities.  According to Twenge (2013), millennials 
and iGen value equality across race, gender, sexuality, and for minorities over any previous 
generation.  While this can be noted as one of the younger generations’ greatest attributes, it 
coincides with a societal shift towards individualism, as it strives to eliminate distinctions (and 
importantly, discrimination) between groups.  Even if younger generations see hierarchies as 
oppressive, the results show that they are nonetheless seeing the world as under those very terms.  
This, coupled with younger generations not adopting a cooperative worldview as much as older 
generations, compounds on seeing the world as more competitive than collaborative.  
The results showing that younger individuals who are more polarized ideologically score 
higher on care/harm moral foundation, as well as the fairness/cheating foundation, indicates that 
iGen and Millennials who are more ideologically polarized consider factors of whether someone 
is being harmed or cared for, and whether someone is being treated fairly, in high regard.   
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Limitations  
Understanding the political and ideological self-categorization differences between 
generations is best comprehended with long-term data collection and with controlling for ageing 
effects.  A long-term study tracking how individuals score on the various scales may lead to 
more significant findings about score variance being a factor of age, generation, or political 
polarization. 
Future research 
I recommend examining these factors over time with long-term studies that control for 
the effect of aging. This will help assess what different generations are valuing at the same ages 
and stages in life, providing a more comprehensive understanding of shifts between birth 
cohorts.  Additionally, if the sixth moral foundation is formally established and inducted into the 
MFQ, I recommend administering the liberty/oppression subscale as part of a revised MFQ.  
While the focus of this paper is on generations, the positive psychology literature on 
individuals will be pertinent in a few key areas; the first being character strengths.   The field of 
positive psychology asserts that individuals can build towards a life of flourishing by focusing on 
strengths as opposed to deficits (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). The classification of character 
strengths rests on virtues being paired with action, and may be an important area of study in 
regards to understanding iGen and Millennials.  I recommend that a follow up study assess what 
traits are becoming more prevalent in younger generations.  The factors should include character 
strengths (as determined by the VIA classification) and the Big Five personality traits.  If these 
factors were assessed in tandem with the scales administered for this survey, analyses of trends 
in not only the 24 VIA character strengths but openness, extroversion, conscientiousness, 
agreeableness, and neuroticism could be examined. This would provide information on not only 
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the values younger generations are endorsing, but any major shifts in character and personality as 
well.  The finding that younger generations have a strong connection between their intellect and 
sense of self (ego) could also prompt further studies into the constructs of identity that are 
driving younger individuals.  
The psychology of traits is used to recognize individual differences that are stable and 
general, but are also shaped by environment and are capable of change (Peterson & Seligman, 
2004).  An additional survey approach assessing who iGen and Millennials “look up to” could 
reveal the character strengths they value and aspire towards.  Exemplars have thus far been 
shown to be important assets to an individual’s ability to cultivate resilience5. While one’s 
resilience may be partially hereditary, it has been shown that certain factors protect and promote 
this trait, including having good role models6. In this way, exemplars not only serve as prodigies 
embodying certain character traits, they are forces in fostering them as well.  Further exploration 
could uncover individuals who embody certain moral foundations, worldviews, or who strongly 
possess intellectual humility.  Such role models could help bridge understanding across groups, 
or help to balance shifts in generational trait trends.  
 
 
 
 
5 Resilience is the quality of demonstrating positive adaptation in the context of adversity, risk, 
or significant challenges (Masten, Cutuli, Herbers, & Reed 2009). 
6 Other protective and promotive factors that predict positive outcomes in the face of high risks 
of adversity include mental agility, optimism, and self-efficacy.  (Masten et al., 2009; 
Reivich & Shatte, 2002) 
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Summary & Conclusions 
The moral and political landscape is shifting as younger generations enter important 
social domains such as college, the workplace, and politics.  Engaging in moral discourse will 
always require establishing virtue terms (Graham et al., 2013), and this study undertook and 
examined Moral Foundations, Worldviews, and Intellectual Humility as important constructs for 
understanding the changes we are seeing.  The results showed that younger generations are 
ascribing to more polarized political groups, seeing the world as more hierarchical and less 
cooperative, all while possessing less intellectual humility. In a disparaging political climate 
where our moral feuds are at their most potent, we may consider further exploration and research 
of intellectual humility as a potential agent for a culture of tolerance, collaboration, and civil 
discourse.   The current polarized environment may be signaling the endangerment of political 
and intellectual diversity, multiplicity and nuance.  Positive psychology may be the field primed 
for answering to this blaring siren, acceding to it as a beacon, redirecting the course for 
generations to come. 
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